Results for 'Wesley C. Salmon'

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  1. (1 other version)Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation Reviewed by.Andrew Lugg - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (1):68-69.
    Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.
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  2. Comentarios a «Explicación teórica y compromisos ontológicos: un modelo estructuralista», de C. Ulises Moulines.Pablo Lorenzano - 2005 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37:55-59.
    In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon's causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation (...)
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  3. Wesley Salmon, a memoir.Merrilee Salmon - 2005 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37:11-16.
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  4. Lakatos and the Euclidean Programme.A. C. Paseau & Wesley Wrigley - forthcoming - In Roman Frigg, Jason Alexander, Laurenz Hudetz, Miklos Rédei, Lewis Ross & John Worrall (eds.), The Continuing Influence of Imre Lakatos's Philosophy: a Celebration of the Centenary of his Birth. Springer.
    Euclid’s Elements inspired a number of foundationalist accounts of mathematics, which dominated the epistemology of the discipline for many centuries in the West. Yet surprisingly little has been written by recent philosophers about this conception of mathematical knowledge. The great exception is Imre Lakatos, whose characterisation of the Euclidean Programme in the philosophy of mathematics counts as one of his central contributions. In this essay, we examine Lakatos’s account of the Euclidean Programme with a critical eye, and suggest an alternative (...)
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  5. Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):294-308.
    ABSTRACTSilencing is a practice that disrupts linguistic and communicative acts, but its relationship to knowledge and justice is not fully understood. Prior models of epistemic injustice tend to c...
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  6. TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES EM BOVINOS: Revisão de literatura.José Pedro Ferreira Machado, Lázaro Kalliu Assis Oliveira & Wesley Paulo Alves de Lima - 2023 - Dissertation, Centro Universitário Una Jataí
    RESUMO A Transferência de Embrião (TE) em bovinos se trata de uma técnica mundialmente disseminada com objetivo de aumentar a capacidade reprodutiva da fêmea. Mantém vínculo direto com outras técnicas das biotecnologias da reprodução, como, a Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), Produção In Vitro e In Vivo de embriões (PIVE) e Transferência de Embrião em Tempo Fixo (TETF), sendo estas, técnicas que fazem parte de um processo, que vai desde a seleção de doadoras, passando pelo preparo dos embriões até sua inovulação em (...)
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  7.  19
    L’exigence de l’explication en biologie à l’égard d’une philosophie de la morphogenèse.Gagnon Philippe - forthcoming - Le Coudray-Macouard: Les Acteurs du Savoir.
    À partir de la question de savoir comment la science peut expliquer, ce texte pose la question à l’égard des formes d’enquêtes qui semblent inaptes à prédire. La question du modèle d’explication qui admettrait des données statistiques est ensuite confrontée aux idéaux rigoureusement prédictivistes et peut-être subrepticement déterministes. En discutant du modèle confirmationniste, on tente ici de tirer les conséquences de l’absence de procédure qui puisse venir disconfirmer en contexte probabiliste. C’est l’occasion de s’interroger sur le mode de résolution des (...)
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  8. The Ontic-Epistemic Debates of Explanation Revisited: The Three-Dimensional Approach.Jinyeong Gim - 2024 - Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce) 74:99-169.
    After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three (...)
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  9. Explicaciones Científicas y No Científicas: El Problema de la Demarcación.Andrés Páez - 2008 - In Juan José Botero, Álvaro Corral, Carlos Cardona & Douglas Niño (eds.), Memorias del Primer Congreso Colombiano de Filosofía. Volumen II. Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. pp. 269-282.
    ¿Existe alguna diferencia filosóficamente significativa entre una explicación científica y las explicaciones que se ofrecen en el curso de la vida diaria? Dado que la mayor parte de las discusiones en la filosofía de la ciencia se refieren al primer tipo de explicaciones, debemos considerar si existe un concepto específico que corresponda al término “explicación científica”, y que sea discontinuo de su contraparte cotidiana. El ensayo tiene cuatro secciones. En cada una de ellas considero diferentes criterios que podrían ser utilizados (...)
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  10. Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):787-806.
    Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: the semantic contents of sentences are structured propositions whose basic components are objects and properties, names are directly referential terms, and a sentence of the form ‘n believes that S’ is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Naive Russellian theory’. In this talk, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory (...)
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  11. A Plea for Pseudo‐Processes†.Elliott Sober - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (3-4):303-309.
    Is all explanations causal explanation? Puzzles about barometer readings "explain" storms and shadow lengths "explaining" flagpole heights make it attractive to think so. Wesley Salmon (1984) has endorsed this causal thesis. One way to test this thesis is to assess the explanatory import of pseudo-processes. I do so by discussing the concept of heritability, which measures a pseudo-process, and one role it played in the theory of natural selection: explaining response to selection. This will show, not just that (...)
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  12. Where’s the biff?Toby Handfield, Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb & Graham Oppy - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68.
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and (...)
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  13. Contrastive Causal Explanation and the Explanatoriness of Deterministic and Probabilistic Hypotheses Theories.Elliott Sober - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
    Carl Hempel (1965) argued that probabilistic hypotheses are limited in what they can explain. He contended that a hypothesis cannot explain why E is true if the hypothesis says that E has a probability less than 0.5. Wesley Salmon (1971, 1984, 1990, 1998) and Richard Jeffrey (1969) argued to the contrary, contending that P can explain why E is true even when P says that E’s probability is very low. This debate concerned noncontrastive explananda. Here, a view of (...)
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  14. Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be (...)
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  15. Understanding Cognition.Gordon Steenbergen - 2015 - Dissertation, Duke University
    Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis (...)
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  16. Explanation and Ontological Reasoning.Dwayne Hudson Mulder - 1997 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
    Philosophical work on explanation has focused on the following two topics: theories of explanation, intended to enumerate necessary and sufficient conditions for explanation, and inference to the best explanation as the strongest form of justification for ontological or metaphysical claims. I critically examine the most important philosophical work in both of these areas and defend my own conclusions about the connections between explanation and ontology. I argue that all of our inferences about the nature of the world, in ontology or (...)
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  17. Is indeterminate identity incoherent?Richard Heck - manuscript
    In "Counting and Indeterminate Identity", N. Ángel Pinillos develops an argument that there can be no cases of `Split Indeterminate Identity'. Such a case would be one in which it was indeterminate whether a=b and indeterminate whether a=c, but determinately true that b≠c. The interest of the argument lies, in part, in the fact that it appears to appeal to none of the controversial claims to which similar arguments due to Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon appeal. I argue for (...)
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  18. In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 470.
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear vulnerable to these anti-causalist challenges, (...)
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  19. Interview with Nathan Salmon.Nathan Salmon & Christian de León - 2018 - Colloquy 2018 (3):19-20.
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  20. Interview with Nathan Salmon, Univeristy of California, Santa Barbara.Nathan Salmon & Leslie F. Wolfe - 2008 - Yale Philosophy Review 2008 (4):78-90.
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  21. Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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  22. True believers : The intentional strategy and why it works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In Anthony Francis Heath (ed.), Scientific explanation: papers based on Herbert Spencer lectures given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
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  23. Singular Concepts.Nathan Salmón - 2024 - Synthese 204 (20).
    Toward a theory of n-tuples of individuals and concepts as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as singular-concept surrogates. Church’s account accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill paradox is misguided. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for Alternative (0). Rather (...)
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  24. Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries.Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):401-420.
    There is a basic distinction, in the realm of spatial boundaries, between bona fide boundaries on the one hand, and fiat boundaries on the other. The former are just the physical boundaries of old. The latter are exemplified especially by boundaries induced through human demarcation, for example in the geographic domain. The classical problems connected with the notions of adjacency, contact, separation and division can be resolved in an intuitive way by recognizing this two-sorted ontology of boundaries. Bona fide boundaries (...)
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  25. Messy Chemical Kinds.Joyce C. Havstad - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):719-743.
    Following Kripke and Putnam, the received view of chemical kinds has been a microstructuralist one. To be a microstructuralist about chemical kinds is to think that membership in said kinds is conferred by microstructural properties. Recently, the received microstructuralist view has been elaborated and defended, but it has also been attacked on the basis of complexities, both chemical and ontological. Here, I look at which complexities really challenge the microstructuralist view; at how the view itself might be made more complicated (...)
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  26. My Philosophical Education.Nathan Salmón - manuscript
    In this candid autobiographical essay, Nathan Salmon recounts and assesses the impact of various philosophers and events on his philosophical development.
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  27. On justifications and excuses.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.
    The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...)
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  28. Parts, Wholes, and Part-Whole Relations: The Prospects of Mereotopology.Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Data and Knowledge Engineering 20:259–286.
    We can see mereology as a theory of parthood and topology as a theory of wholeness. How can these be combined to obtain a unified theory of parts and wholes? This paper examines various non-equivalent ways of pursuing this task, with specific reference to its relevance to spatio-temporal reasoning. In particular, three main strategies are compared: (i) mereology and topology as two independent (though mutually related) chapters; (ii) mereology as a general theory subsuming topology; (iii) topology as a general theory (...)
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  29. The niche.Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):214-238.
    The concept of niche (setting, context, habitat, environment) has been little studied by ontologists, in spite of its wide application in a variety of disciplines from evolutionary biology to economics. What follows is a first formal theory of this concept, a theory of the relations between objects and their niches. The theory builds upon existing work on mereology, topology, and the theory of spatial location as tools of formal ontology. It will be illustrated above all by means of simple biological (...)
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  30. The phenomenal content of experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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  31. On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions about its actual content remain relatively unexplored. We (...)
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  32. Boundaries, continuity, and contact.Achille C. Varzi - 1997 - Noûs 31 (1):26-58.
    There are conflicting intuitions concerning the status of a boundary separating two adjacent entities (or two parts of the same entity). The boundary cannot belong to both things, for adjacency excludes overlap; and it cannot belong to neither, for nothing lies between two adjacent things. Yet how can the dilemma be avoided without assigning the boundary to one thing or the other at random? Some philosophers regard this as a reductio of the very notion of a boundary, which should accordingly (...)
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  33. Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...)
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  34. Vagueness in Geography.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49–65.
    Some have argued that the vagueness exhibited by geographic names and descriptions such as ‘Albuquerque’, ‘the Outback’, or ‘Mount Everest’ is ultimately ontological: these terms are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and hold the view that geographic vagueness is exclusively semantic, or conceptual at large. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive a mountain to be, each with its precise (...)
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  35. Hypothetical motivation.Donald C. Hubin - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):31-54.
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  36. Irrational desires.Donald C. Hubin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
    Many believe that the rational evaluation of actions depends on the rational evaluation of even basic desires. Hume, though, viewed desires as "original existences" which cannot be contrary to either truth or reason. Contemporary critics of Hume, including Norman, Brandt and Parfit, have sought a basis for the rational evaluation of desires that would deny some basic desires reason-giving force. I side with Hume against these modern critics. Hume's concept of rational evaluation is admittedly too narrow; even basic desires are, (...)
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  37. Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism.Achille C. Varzi - 2011 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving nature at its joints: natural kinds in metaphysics and science. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 129–153.
    Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary —hence any object—the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our so-cial practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?
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  38. What’s Special about Humeanism.Donald C. Hubin - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):30-45.
    One of the attractions of the Humean instrumentalist theory of practical rationality is that it appears to offer a special connection between an agent's reasons and her motivation. The assumption that Humeanism is able to assert a strong connection between reason and motivation has been challenged, most notably by Christine Korsgaard. She argues that Humeanism is not special in the connection it allows to motivation. On the contrary, Humean theories of practical rationality do connect reasons and motivation in a unique (...)
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  39. Omissions and Causal Explanations.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - In Francesca Castellani & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag. pp. 155–167.
    In previous work I have argued that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: typically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative description. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative (...)
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  40. Eleutheric-Conjectural Libertarianism: a Concise Philosophical Explanation.J. C. Lester - 2022 - MEST Journal 10 (2):111-123.
    The two purposes of this essay. The general philosophical problem with most versions of social libertarianism and how this essay will proceed. The specific problem with liberty explained by a thought-experiment. The positive and abstract theory of interpersonal liberty-in-itself as ‘the absence of interpersonal initiated constraints on want-satisfaction’, for short ‘no initiated impositions’. The individualistic liberty-maximisation theory solves the problems of clashes, defences, and rectifications without entailing interpersonal utility comparisons or libertarian consequentialism. The practical implications of instantiating liberty: three rules (...)
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  41. A Paradox about Sets of Properties.Nathan Salmón - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12777-12793.
    A paradox about sets of properties is presented. The paradox, which invokes an impredicatively defined property, is formalized in a free third-order logic with lambda-abstraction, through a classically proof-theoretically valid deduction of a contradiction from a single premise to the effect that every property has a unit set. Something like a model is offered to establish that the premise is, although classically inconsistent, nevertheless consistent, so that the paradox discredits the logic employed. A resolution through the ramified theory of types (...)
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  42. Relaxing Mask Mandates in New Jersey: A Tale of Two Universities.Wesley J. Park - 2022 - Voices in Bioethics 8.
    The ethical question is whether university mask mandates should be relaxed. I argue that the use of face masks by healthy individuals has uncertain benefits, which potential harms may outweigh, and should therefore be voluntary. Systematic reviews by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Cochrane Acute Respiratory Infections concluded that the use of face masks by healthy individuals in the community lacks effectiveness in reducing viral transmission based on moderate-quality evidence. The only two randomized controlled trials of face masks published (...)
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  43. A Note on the Transitivity of Parthood.Achille C. Varzi - 2006 - Applied ontology 1 (2):141-146.
    That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classical mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The diagnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity on behalf of classical mereology.
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  44. Explanation and Cognition.Frank C. Keil & Robert Andrew Wilson - 2000 - MIT Press. Edited by Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson.
    These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual..
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  45. Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 83 (C):102950.
    Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for (...)
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  46. How to Measure the Standard Metre.Nathan Salmon - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):193 - 217.
    Nathan Salmon; XII*—How to Measure the Standard Metre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193–218.
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  47. Is there a future for AI without representation?Vincent C. Müller - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115.
    This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...)
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  48. Fictitious Existence versus Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien.
    A correct observation to the effect that a does not exist, where ‘a’ is a singular term, could be true on any of a variety of grounds. Typically, a true, singular negative existential is true on the unproblematic ground that the subject term ‘a’ designates something that does not presently exist. More interesting philosophically is a singular, negative existential statement in which the subject term ‘a’ designates nothing at all. Both of these contrast sharply with a singular, negative existential in (...)
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  49. Models and minds.Stuart C. Shapiro & William J. Rapaport - 1991 - In Robert C. Cummins (ed.), Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 215--259.
    Cognitive agents, whether human or computer, that engage in natural-language discourse and that have beliefs about the beliefs of other cognitive agents must be able to represent objects the way they believe them to be and the way they believe others believe them to be. They must be able to represent other cognitive agents both as objects of beliefs and as agents of beliefs. They must be able to represent their own beliefs, and they must be able to represent beliefs (...)
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  50. Knowledge and truth: A skeptical challenge.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):93-101.
    It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical (...)
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